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This article investigates the interplay between formal standards, essential patents and 
informal industry alliances such as consortia and patent pools. Building upon more than 
6.200 declarations of essential patents to major international Standard Development 
Organizations (SDO), we investigate how informal standardization consortia and patent 
pools influence the number and timing of patent declarations to formal SDOs. This is 
the first thorough empirical investigation of the effectiveness of industry-driven 
coordination mechanisms addressing the problems raised by the high number of patents. 
We find that patent pools increase the number of declared essential patents controlling 
for the effects of standardization. On the other hand, informal consortia reduce the 
number of patent declarations at given standardization activity. These findings confirm 
results in the literature that patent pools provide incentives for strategic patent files and 
that informal standardization consortia have a regulatory function on the firms’ patent 
strategies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last ten years, the interplay between patents and technological standards has attracted 
increasing attention in the academic literature and among policy makers. Recent policy efforts rely 
upon the view that providing for reliable and economically sensitive rules on Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) in standardization is necessary for a “digital society”3 and beneficial for innovation4. 
On a different stance, it is perceived that the failure to address these issues would threaten 
competition and increase the risk of anticompetitive strategies5. In parallel to these policy efforts, 
standardizing firms have themselves come up with coordination mechanisms in order to improve 
the interplay between patents and standards. Probably the most important mechanisms 
accompanying formal standardization are industry consortia and patent pools. It is the aim of this 
paper to study the effect of these industry-driven mechanisms, and more particularly to analyze 
their impact on the number of patents declared essential to formal technology standards.  
Two developments are the probable trigger for the recent interest in patents essential to 
technological standards: In the first place, the rise of the information and communication society 
strongly relies on interoperability of technologies, making common standards indispensable. As a 
result, not only the quantity but also the importance of standards strongly increased during the last 
decades (Blind & Gauch, 2008). Secondly, accompanying this development is the growing 
importance of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), mainly patents, which are essential to widely 
adopted standards (Bekkers et al., 2001). A patent is called essential for a standard when it is 
necessarily infringed by any implementation of the standard. Technological standards are 
increasingly complex and incorporate sophisticated technology resulting from costly firm R&D. 
The inclusion of technology protected by patents has proven to be necessary for an increasing 
number of important technological standards.   
Even though both the patent and the standard system are important institutions shaping technology-
intensive network industries, their interplay has often been viewed with suspicion. It is a widely 
shared belief that patents or other IPR are a necessary incentive for companies to innovate. 
Nevertheless, in network industries and other sectors where innovations are cumulative and many 
innovating firms build upon the research of each other, the role of patents is more ambiguous. As 
                                                
3 Digital Agenda for Europe 2010-2020. See http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245:EN:NOT 
4 European Commission White Paper “Modernising ICT standardization: The way forward”. The 
White Paper can be consulted at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfm?lang=fr&item_id=3263 
5 Draft Communication of the European Commission „Guidelines on the applicability of Article 
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union to horizontal co-operation agreements“; 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_horizontals/guidelines_en.pdf 
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patents confer the right to exclude others from the use of the technology, they allow holders of 
complementary patents to block each other. Problems of blocking patents on a standard can result in 
high transaction costs, prohibitive costs for products implementing a standard and slow diffusion of 
new technologies. These problems have been labeled as “tragedy of the anticommons” (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998).  
A further aspect to the interplay between patents and standards is that inclusion into a standard may 
increase the commercial value of a patent for its holder (Rysman and Simcoe, 2006, Bekkers et al. 
2001). Standardization thus generates additional incentives for strategic firm behavior regarding 
their patent portfolios. In some cases, strategic behaviors regarding essential patents have led to 
contentions. Especially the litigation cases involving Rambus and Qualcomm raised the attention of 
antitrust authorities and reinforced the political discussion about IP regulations concerning 
standards (Hovenkamp, 2008; Bensen & Levinson, 2009; Devlin, 2009).  
In spite of this increased awareness of the importance of essential patents for standard setting, there 
has been so far little research on the effectiveness of possible solutions and regulation mechanisms. 
Intellectual Property rules of standard setting organizations are becoming increasingly important in 
regulating the market (Lemley, 2002). Shurmer and Lea urged in 1995 that IPR on standards is a 
topic of public interest and that the potential problems need to be discussed on an international 
level. In Europe, the European Commission has recently taken several initiatives in order to provide 
SDOs with an improved policy framework and avoiding that problems of essential patents slow 
down or deteriorate the outcomes of standardization6.  
In parallel to the advances in the regulatory framework, firm-driven regulation mechanisms have 
emerged in industries where standard setting is most crucial and where essential patents are most 
likely to give rise to contentions. Industry consortia and other informal firm alliances evolve around 
formal standardization projects. Many industry consortia are themselves active in standardization 
and help overcoming blockings in the standardization process resulting from burdensome and 
lengthy procedures in the formal bodies. More generally, many consortia and alliances provide a 
forum for firms involved in standardization to discuss policy issues and to settle contentions on 
essential IPR. 
Another promising instrument in clearing blocking positions arising from essential patents held by 
various owners is the creation of patent pools. A patent pool is an arrangement for offering joint 
licenses for the patents of pool members to third parties. The licensing revenue is redistributed to 
the owners of the patents. Patent pools can significantly reduce transaction costs encourage rapid 
                                                
6 See notes 3, 4, and 5 
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implementation of technological standards. Nevertheless, patent pools as any price fixing 
mechanism have the potential to distort or reduce competition and must therefore meet concrete 
standards regarding their licensing policies and setting7. Furthermore, redistribution of royalty 
income is a contentious issue. Most pools redistribute royalties according to the shares of patents 
held by the various pool members. Such royalty distribution schemes provide further incentives for 
filing many patents; so that patent pools could themselves contribute to the patent thicket they are 
designed to clear.  
This article will explore the effect of patent pools and industry consortia on the interplay between 
standards and patents in greater detail. We will analyze the timing of patent declarations with 
respect to standardization, and study the correlation between standard characteristics and the 
number of patents declared essential. We will then analyze how this interplay is affected by 
industry consortia and patent pools. The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 1 
reviews the literature and works out the research hypotheses. Section 2 outlines our methodology 
and describes the construction of the data set. Section 3 discusses descriptive results, and section 4 
presents the results of analytical investigation. Section 5 sketches the outline for future research and 
concludes.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RELEVANCE OF INVESTIGATION 
Several articles have explored the issue how standardization affects the motives of companies to file 
patents. Blind et al. (2006) find that taking influence on standardization is not one of the main 
incentives to patent. It has furthermore been found that companies with a high patent intensity are 
less likely to participate in standardization (Blind & Thumm, 2004). On the other hand, Koehler et 
al. (2010) identified a strategic patent filing behavior for essential patents. The latter analysis 
revealed that patents which are essential to a standard are pending significantly longer than the ones 
in the control group. These results indicate a strategic adjustment of patents in order to make sure 
that the protected technology is essential to the standard. Evidence for strategies to file patents such 
as to cover standard-essential technology has also been found in other analyses. Layne-Farrar 
(2008) revealed that ex post patents are of less value than ex ante patents as to a standard release, 
which is a further indicator of strategic and opportunistic patent behavior.  
Strategic considerations can affect not only the choice of companies to file patents on standard-
essential technology, but also the choice to disclose and declare existing patents as essential. Layne-
Farrar (2010) furthermore reveals that in contradiction with common perception most patents are 
                                                
7 See J. Lerner and J. Tirole (2004) and D. Quint (2006) 
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declared essential well after the standard is released. These widely practiced declaration strategies 
can nevertheless be thought of as detrimental, since Bensen & Levinson (2009) remark that ex ante 
disclosures and ex ante agreed license fees would more likely increase incentive of companies to 
invest in R&D. 
The literature thus indicates that standard setting has an impact on the decisions of firms to file and 
declare patents protecting technology included into the standard. This might in some cases allow 
opportunistic behavior. Nevertheless, the standardization process itself is not alone in determining 
the patent filing and disclosing behaviors, as other determinants come into play. Most importantly, 
the analysis needs to take into account firm alliances such informal standard consortia and patent 
pools that are connected to a formal standard.  
Informal consortia are very heterogeneous in characteristics such as technical issues, structure, 
members, transparency or IP policies (Cargill, 2002; Pohlmann, 2010). Updegrove (2008) defines 
consortia as being “anything from a loose, unincorporated affiliation of companies, to an 
incorporated entity with offices, marketing, technical and administrative staff and a multi-million 
dollar budget”. Especially the treatment of IPR protected standards and the influence to formal 
standard setting were subject to evaluations of the role of informal consortia. Leiponen (2008) 
revealed that participation in informal consortia improves the participation in formal standardization 
when analyzing the case of the ETSI 3GPP committee. Blind and Gauch (2008) identified a 
complementary relationship of formal and informal standardization on the technical layer and 
revealed a positive correlation between formal and informal standardization activities. Rysman and 
Simcoe (2007) support a political interest in informal consortia, as they can function as an 
important technology selector. Even though Devlin (2009) explains failures of IPR treatments in 
consortia, he proposes solutions how informal consortia might act as royalty regulators ex ante – 
before the industry has incurred substantial sunk cost in implementing the standardized technology. 
The empirical findings in the literature clearly indicate that informal consortia can be 
complementary rather than alternative to formal standardization. Informal consortium activity can 
play an important role for formal standard setting in coordinating firm strategies in the 
implementation of the standard. For instance, informal consortia can play a role in coordinating 
applied R&D necessary to implement the objectives set out by a formal technological standard. This 
would result in lower costs, as the duplication of R&D efforts is avoided. Furthermore, informal 
consortia can play the role of a forum where firms agree on common rules to avoid inefficient non-
cooperative behaviors. A high propensity to patent can be an outcome of inefficient non-
cooperative firm strategies, when each firm tries to build up an important patent portfolio in order to 
gain bargaining power with respect to other industry players or reap important shares of licensing 
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revenue from patent pools (Parchomowsky and Wagner, 2005). In both cases, consortia would 
increase efficiency by reducing the number of essential patents at given standardization activity. 
Therefore we propose Hypothesis I: 
H1: The existence of an informal consortium, controlling for standardization activity and standard 
size, reduces the number of patents declared essential for a formal standard. 
A second external factor which might influence a patent declaration is the existence of a patent 
pool. Even though a patent pool has no connection to standardization processes, patents that protect 
a standard are often incorporated in a patent pool. Contrary to most economic assumptions that pool 
participation is automatic, Farrar and Lerner (2008) show that companies decide joining a pool 
depending on the pursued profit sharing rule. They furthermore reveal that entering a pool may 
allow the firms to include patents of a limited economic value. Baron and Delcamp (2010) find 
evidence for the strategic inclusion of low quality patents into pools. Especially earlier pool 
members are able to include more patents and patents of lower quality into a pool, compared to new 
members. Since being an initial pool member might create first mover advantages, Lampe and 
Moser (2009) revealed strategic patent filing, when a pool creation was expected.  
Including patents in a pool might also improve the value of a patent, as Delcamp (2010) showed 
that pool patents are cited more often not only because pools tend to select high quality patents, but 
also because the introduction of a patent into a pool induces an increase in the number of citations. 
Gilbert (2009) however created a model that reveals a greater royalty stream for independent 
licensors outside a pool. Consistently with this prediction, Lampe and Moser (2009) find that a 
patent pool increases the incentives to file patents not only for pool members, but also for 
companies holding complementary patents staying outside the pool. 
Empirical and theoretical literature indicates a positive effect on the number patent files when a 
pool is created both for pool members and companies staying outside. Hence, we propose 
Hypothesis II: 
H2: The existence of a patent pool, controlling for standardization activity and standard size, 
increases the number of patents declared essential for a formal standard. 
METHODOLOGY 
We test the aforementioned hypotheses empirically using an extensive database. Unlike the existing 
literature, our research jointly takes information on formal standardization, informal consortia and 
patent pools into account in determining the driving factors of patent declarations. Thus we are able 
to identify and isolate the effects of each of these institutions on the number of patent declarations.  
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Comparing firm’s contribution to different standards is always difficult, as unobservable factors 
such as technological characteristics or the commercial relevance of the standardization project 
crucially impact patent declarations and other firm decisions. We will use longitudinal data and 
panel methodology in order to rule out that unobservable factors bias our results. Therefore we 
undertook extensive work on the data in order to inform all relevant variables over a time span from 
1992 to 2010. To ensure a clear and reasonable distinction of different standards, our analysis only 
focuses on formal standard developing organizations (SDO) which operate on an international level. 
Our data includes standards from ISO, IEC, JTC1 – a joint committee of ISO and IEC – 
CEN/CENELEC, ITU and IEEE. However, the latter two organizations are in some earlier 
literature considered as being informal (Rysman & Simcoe, 2007). We identified them as formal 
because standardization procedures, IP policies and organizational structures are conform with the 
formal standard bodies. This classification also finds support in several literature sources (Iversen, 
2002; Leiponen, 2008; Blind & Gauch, 2008). As all these institutions practice the same IPR policy, 
we can rule out that institutional factors affect the comparability between standards in our sample.  
Focusing on formal SDOs has the advantage that we can use a normalized unit of analysis, the 
standard. By contrast, the output of informal standardization can come in very detailed technical 
specifications or highly aggregated standardization projects. Furthermore all standards of these 
organizations are included in the PERINORM database, which insures a comparable understanding 
of a standard unit. PERINORM is the world’s biggest database with bibliographic information on 
formal standards and is regularly updated by the SDOs DIN, BSI and AFNOR. From PERINORM,      
As our analysis focuses on the interplay between standards and patents, we only take into account 
standards for which at least one patent has been declared essential. In order to avoid any selection 
bias, we use all patent statements made to the most important SDOs which are stated above.8 
More than 6.200 patent declarations were retrieved in March 2010 from the patent statements 
available at the websites of the aforementioned formal SDOs. Each SDO has a separate patent 
statement data base, where the disclosing company has to state the formal standard identification 
number, the date of registration and the patents affected. We labeled each patent declared essential 
to each standard as one declaration. For example a patent statement for two patents declared 
essential to two different standards is counted as four declarations. Empty or so-called blanket 
                                                
8 Declarations to ETSI are not included in our analysis, since they refer to technical specifications 
or standard projects, which are not comparable to a formal standard and thus cannot be categorized 
due to data conformity. ETSI is is a special case, and stands for over 90 % of the patent declarations 
on formal standards. In the following, all our results refer to formal SDOs excluding ETSI. 
Generalizing our results to include semi-formal and informal standard setting will be one of our 
next working steps. 
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patent statements - i.e. statements of ownership of essential IPR that do not provide patent numbers 
- were also counted as one declaration. Counting separately individual patents that are declared 
together in one statement and taking into account blanket statements means that we have a 
“maximal interpretation” of the patent databases. For this reason, our number of declarations is 
higher than the number of patents used in other research projects that focus on the same SDOs 
(Bekkers and Martinelli, 2010). 
The count of IPR declarations is only an approximation of the valid patents that are essential for a 
standard. Firms declare IPR they believe to be essential, but no objective evaluation of this claim is 
made. It might therefore be the case that many of the declarations relate to patents that are not really 
essential to the standard. On the other hand, even though some SDOs oblige firms participating in 
standardization to declare their essential IPR, it cannot be guaranteed that all essential patents are 
accurately declared. As firms participating in standardization are often large corporations owning 
big patent portfolios, it is possible that firms do not declare their essential patents because they were 
not aware of their existence. More generally, using patent statement databases does not allow us to 
disentangle the effects of explanatory variables on patent filing and patent declaration strategies. In 
spite of these limitations, we believe that the count of patent declarations is a valid indicator of the 
patent intensity of a standard. The decision to declare an existing patent as essential for a standard 
and the decision to file a new patent on technology included into a standard are clearly different, but 
both are probably driven by the same factors determining the profitability of essential patents.  
A match of the different patent statements identified 647 distinct standards, where some standards 
were accredited in more than one SDO. If that was the case, the SDO of first release was the 
selected reference. Most of the statements were made within the last twenty years and thus the data 
panel includes all half year periods between 1992 and 2010.  
We matched 647 formal standards to PERINORM, where we obtain information on standardization 
activities and characteristic such as standard release, version release, standard amendment, 
technological class or number of standard pages.  
The formal standards are wherever possible linked to informal industry alliances arising around 
standardization. In particular, we use data from the 15 editions of the CEN survey of ICT consortia, 
identifying 453 informal consortia since 1998. Since there is no commonly accepted definition of 
informal standards consortia, our consortia database only includes organizations that meet the 
following selection criteria stated by the CEN survey: “The organization must be international in 
outlook and scope, not simply an instrument of single-nation policy, must have an active and 
international membership, must not be set-up specifically as a single vendor, government, or 
proprietary technology advocacy group and must be of importance to the areas of standardization or 
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its processes”9. The existence of a consortium does not always imply a contribution to standards 
setting. Therefore we used the date of first mention in the CEN survey as the first date of existence. 
For each consortium we thus label “consortium activity” the period during which the above stated 
criteria are met.  
We further identify 43 existing patent pools and 11 failed attempts to create a patent pool. Several 
consortia and patent pools can directly be related to formal standardization projects. For example 
the MPEG4 Industry Forum is an informal consortium accompanying the formal standardization of 
MPEG4 standards in JTC1, and the MPEG4 Visual Patent Pool managed by MPEGLA, which is a 
patent pool offering licenses needed for implementing the MPEG4 visual standard. Proceeding this 
way, 115 standards in our sample can be related to an industry consortium and 39 standards to at 
least one patent pool. 
The relation of a formal standard to an informal consortium is not always as obvious as to a patent 
pool and has to be explained in more detail. The matching was solely conducted on the standard 
level. A match of essential patents was not perused since our observation also includes empty 
declarations. Most informal consortia such as MPEG4, ECMA or IETF have official liaison 
statements for the respective formal standards. A liaison implies an accreditation and a cooperative 
standardization development between the formal and informal standards bodies. If an official 
statement was not given, a more detailed analysis of the respective standards was conducted. 
Consortia standards that include or build up on formal standards that matched our database were 
therefore included. A list of all informal consortia that matched our database can be found in the 
annex. In total 45 different informal consortia could be related to 115 formal standards that include 
essential patents. The interplay of informal and formal standard setting is very complex and the 
concrete repartition of tasks cannot always be identified. Liaisons are in many cases simultaneous 
processes where the formal committee works in close cooperation with an informal consortium.     
We have thus produced a comprehensive database covering the quasi-totality of formal 
technological standards for which there is at least one essential patent. For all these standards we 
inform variables on three different layers of analysis: on the IP layer, we have information on the 
disclosing firms and on the disclosures, on the technology layer, we have detailed information on 
the technological characteristics of the standard and on standardization activity, and on the industry 
layer we make use of comprehensive data on standardization consortia and patent pools. As all 
information is given in longitudinal data, we can run fixed effect panel estimations to exclude 
obvious biases due to unobserved effects.  
                                                
9 CEN/ISSS 2009, page 10 
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DESCRIPTION OF THE DATABASE 
Table 1 illustrates the number of standards that include essential IPR by SDO and the mean number 
of declarations per standard.  
Table1. By SDO: number of standards with at least one patent statement / mean declarations per 
standard 
SDO Standards including patents (share) Mean, declarations per standard 
JTC1 109   (16.74%) 18.33 
ITU-T 290   (44.55%) 7.01 
ISO 91   (13.98%) 2.70 
IEEE 79   (12.14%) 23.41 
IEC 63     (9.68%) 1.38 
CEN-CENELEC 19     (2.92%) 1.05 
Table 1 shows that ITU-T has the biggest share of standards including IPR, making almost 45% of 
all regarded standards of the sample. On the other hand, most patents per standards can be found for 
IEEE, where companies in average state 23.41 declarations. Comparing the total number of 
declaration per SDO reveals that JTC1, IEEE and ITU-T each report more than 2000 declarations 
since 1992 and thus jointly stand for almost 95% of all patent declarations in the sample.  
To better estimate the technological layer, all standards were categorized by the international 
standard classification number (ICS). Table 2 outlines the technological classes of the standards 
with at least one patent. The standard classes 33, 35, 37 can be summarized as information and 
communication technologies (ICT), which sum a share of more than 86% of all standards in the 
sample. Again changing from the standards to the patent perspective reveals that ICT standards 
have the highest average share of patent declarations. In total 98% of all declarations were made for 
ICT standards. This underlines the relevance for patents in this technological field.  
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03: Services 4    (0.71%) 4,25 
25: Manufacturing Engineering 26    (4.63%) 1,85 
29: Electrical Engineering 5    (0.89%) 1,2 
31: Electronics 12    (2.14%) 1,67 
33: Telecommunications.  262    (46.7%) 8,21 
35: Information Technology.  222  (39.57%) 15,9 
37: Image Technology 5    (0.89%) 10,6 
43: Road Vehicle Engineering 7    (1.25%) 1,57 
49: Aircraft / Space Vehicle  9      (1.6%) 1,11 
97: Household / Commercial Equipment.  9      (1.6%) 1 
 
To better measure how many standards include essential IPR in a general standard picture, the 
constructed panel was compared to all standards without IPR in the respective standard bodies, in 
each time period and only including ICT standards (classes: 33, 35 and 37). The analysis reveals a 
rise in the number of active ICT standards, as standards without IPR increased by almost 30% over 
the last ten years (excluding year 2010) and the standards including IPR increased by almost 150% 
(excluding year 2010). The share of standards including IPR increased from 0.21% in 1992 to 
6.17% in 2010. Since not all patent declarations are made before a standard release, the truncation 
effect has to be kept in mind, which would even increase the share of standards that include IPR. 
The development during the last two decades underlines the growing importance of standards that 
include essential patents. However, the outcome of further statistical results has to be restricted to a 
sample of 6.17% of all ICT standards and thus only represents standards including essential patents. 
Graph 1 displays all declarations on standards each year in a time period from 1992 to 2009. The 
data panel shows that the distribution of patents on standards is in some cases concentrated on a 
certain standard project. Therefore the graph illustrates the top standard projects in peak periods that 





Graph1: Declarations per year and peak standard projects 
 
The first peak is in 1998 where the MPEG4 (Moving Picture Experts Group) standards 
ISO/IEC14496 (JTC1) sum over 45% of all declarations. The next peak in 2003 is also caused by 
the MPEG4 declarations but also by the IEEE 802 LAN (Local Area Network) project and the 
JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group) standards of JTC1 which all together sum around 43% of 
all declarations. The last peak is again caused by the IEEE 802 standard that alone sums over 55% 
of all declarations.   
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
To support our research question we firstly want to identify the influencing factors of patent 
declarations on a descriptive basis. The constructed data panel allows an evaluation of the timing of 
patent declarations. Most intellectual property policies of the formal standard bodies require a 
complete patent disclosure of all companies that own relevant patents, before the standard is 
released. A disclosure is a statement to the respective working group or commission in a very early 
stage of standardization, before any official documents are released. A declaration in comparison is 
a public statement to the SDO which can be recognized by everyone, not only by internal 
commissions or working groups. While a disclosure seems to be vaguer and tends to show all 
possible affected technologies, a declaration is stated in a later phase of standardization and is thus 
more tangible and convincing. 
 
 14 
Graph2: Timing of patent declaration by the reference date of standard release 
 
The preceding graph 2 shows the timing of patent declarations as measured by our declaration count 
with respect to the first release of the respective standard. Taking all declarations to the reference of 
the date of standard release, graph 2 illustrates the timing of declaration. 56% of all declarations are 
made later than one year after the first standard version is officially released. Slightly less than 35% 
of all declarations are stated ex ante or in the year of standard release. 
Since a standard develops over time and thus may have new releases of versions, a more detailed 
estimation of the data is necessary. Only the ISO and JTC1 patent statements indicate the referred 
version and are matched in graph 3 for JTC1 and ISO. Using the version reference changes the 
picture for the JTC1 declarations where only around 20% of all declarations are stated one year or 
later than the version release. A share of 27% of all declarations was stated more than one year after 
the version release at ISO. 
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Graph3: Timing of declaration by reference version release for JTC1 and ISO standards 
 
These results show that a new version may also include new technologies and thus new patents that 
protect these technologies. However, one fourth of the declarations are still stated ex post. In 
conformity with the results of Layne-Farrar (2010), who analyzed ETSI disclosures and found that 
only 5.2 % are state ex ante, we reveal that a significant share of declarations are made in a way that 
seems disconnected from the standardization process. These results justify our research 
investigation on the effects of industry coordination mechanisms on the number of patent 
declarations.  
In addition to the release of a standard or a new standard version, there is also the possibility to 
agree on a standard amendment: “An amendment alters and/or adds to previously agreed technical 
provisions in an existing International Standard” (ISO/IEC, 2009). Since an amendment has the 
same committee agreement procedures as a standard release, we created a variable in our data panel 
called “standardization activity” that summarized all releases of versions and amendments. Graph 4 
displays the relationship of declarations and standardization activity in a scatter box. Data was 
transformed to a logarithmic scale to reduce the results to a manageable range and show a more 
vivid picture. The logarithmic transformation also explains the high number of zero values, since 
there is a high amount of standards that only have one release or only one declaration. However, 
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graph 4 already indicates a positive relationship between patent declarations and standardization 
activities. 
Graph4: Scatter box of patent declarations and standardization activity on a logarithmic scale 
 
Another hypothesis is to verify that the size of the standard has an influence on a patent declaration. 
Therefore we extracted the number of pages for each observed standard from the PERINORM 
database. Graph 5 reveals that there is a positive effect between patent declarations and the number 
of standard pages. Thus we can evidence a size effect; the bigger a standard the more patents are 





Graph 5: Scatter box of declarations and standard pages on a logarithmic scale 
 
Our first descriptive results of the declaration patterns already indicate that our declaration count is 
a meaningful measure of an economic reality that is closely linked to the timing and importance of a 
standardization project. Nevertheless, we also find evidence that the activity and the characteristics 
of a standard itself might not be the only factors that can influence a patent declaration. We were 
able to match the existence of informal standards consortia and patent pools to our panel of formal 
standards, to test external factors of declarations.  
Table 3 clearly shows that standards that can be connected to a pool or an informal consortium have 
a much higher average number of declarations. These standards also have on average a higher 
number of pages, more releases and are more often amended. Furthermore, there seems to be a link 
between pools and consortia: indeed, out of 39 standards that can be linked to a pool, 31 can also be 
linked to a consortium (out of the 628 standards for which there is no pool, only 84 can be linked to 
a consortium).  
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Table3: Average number of declarations per standard 
Sample Mean 
all standards 9.57 
standards connected to a pool 96.04 
standards not connected to a pool 6.41 
standards connected to a consortium 15.13 
standards not connected to a consortium 4.16 
 
Taking into account the positive correlation between standard consortia and patent pools as well as 
between both these instruments and the number of declarations, standardization activity and number 
of pages, the effect of consortia or pools on patent declarations cannot clearly be distinguished. 
Therefore econometric analysis is needed to control for all these factors that have been found to be 
relevant. Furthermore, panel analysis helps in getting clearer insights into the direction of causality.  
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
In a first step, we run cross section regressions to estimate the number of declarations on a standard. 
We include the number of releases, amendments and standard pages as explanatory variables to 
capture the effect of standardization itself. We add dummy variables giving 1 if there is a pool or a 
consortium that can be linked to this particular standard. In order to control for truncation, we add 
the age of the standard as control variable. Furthermore, we control for SDO and ICS class effects 
(both statistically not significant). Our explained variable is count, so that we use a poisson 
estimator. 
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1: Cross section poisson estimation of patent declarations  Observations: 505 
Pseudo R2: 0.6439 
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust Standard error   (z statistic) 
Consortium 0.4105 0.2975  (1.38) 
Pool 1.9543 0.2984  (6.55) 
Releases 0.3908 0.2955  (1.32) 
Amendments 0.0527 0.0213  (2.48) 
Max. Number of pages 0.00069 0.00018  (3.79) 
Age of the standard 0.0020 0.0015  (1.28) 
SDO control 0.0588 0.0856  (0.69) 
Class control -0.0347 0.0245  (0.16) 
Constant 0.1199 1.0144  (0.12) 
 
The econometric results confirm our descriptive findings. Standard size, as measured by the number 
of pages, has a clear impact on the number of declared patents. Taking into account the effect of 
standard size, the number of amendments, but not the number of releases has a significant positive 
effect on the number of declarations. This could indicate that many amendments to a standard are 
made with the objective to include technology protected by patents.  
The existence of a pool has a positive and very significant effect on the number of declared patents. 
The effect of the existence of a consortium is not significant. It is at this stage not possible to 
interpret these findings as indicating a causal relationship, since it may well be argued that causality 
can go in both directions. Especially pools are likely to be created for standards with a high number 
of essential patents. In order to investigate this issue, we reverse the supposed direction of causality 
of the analysis.  
We run logistic regressions to explain the existence of a pool / consortium (results in annex). Only 
the existence of a consortium is a significant factor in explaining the existence of a pool. This 
strong link between consortium and pool was expected taken into account the strong correlation 
evidenced in the descriptive findings. This link could be interpreted as an indicator of the positive 
effect of consortia on creating consensus among patent holders involved in standardization. In 
explaining the existence of consortia, while number of declarations and standard characteristics are 
not significant, the number of declaring firms is a positive and significant factor. This could hint to 
the fact that consortia are created when the number of patent holders increases so that coordination 
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becomes difficult. Nevertheless these logistic regressions cannot provide a full theory of the 
creation of industry alliances such as pools or consortia. In order to explain the creation of patent 
pools, standardization consortia and other firm alliances around formal standard setting, future work 
steps will have to rely upon firm level data. For our purpose it is enough to state that uncertainty 
about the direction of causation makes further analyses necessary. 
Another potential problem that could lead to a bias is that we do not directly observe the 
commercial value or the technological complexity of a standard. It is possible that these unobserved 
factors jointly drive the number of patent declarations, standard releases and amendments upwards 
and increase the likelihood that there will be informal consortia and patent pools. This would be one 
reason more why the positive and significant coefficients cannot be interpreted as indicating a 
causal relationship.  
In order to deal with the problems of unobserved heterogeneity regarding variables such as 
commercial value and technological complexity, we use fixed effect panel analysis. We argue that 
these unobserved factors are to a sufficient amount fixed over the lifetime of a standard so that fixed 
effect regression will not be biased and coefficients can be safely interpreted.  
Our explained variable is still the number of declarations on a standard, but this time the 
observation is a half-year time span for each standard. This means that we count the patents 
declared essential to a standard during this particular period. Our explanatory variables still include 
characteristics of the standardization process, such as the number of amendments or of releases in 
this particular period or the number of pages the standard had at this moment. To control for the 
usual timing of patent declarations with respect to standard age and releases, we introduce various 
age variables, such as the age of the standard (time since first release), the square of the age of the 
standard, and the time since the release of the latest standard version. Our main explanatory 
variables are dummies on the activity of consortia or pools, which give one if at this moment there 
was a pool or consortium active for this standard. We also include a “pool to be launched” variable, 
which gives one if a pool launch will take place in the 3 half-year periods to come. As control 
variables, we still use class and SDO controls, and we add a time control to exclude time fixed 
effects or truncation problems. To address the problem of truncation, we furthermore drop 
observations for 2009 and 2010 (but all results hold the same if we keep them). As we expect 
unobserved heterogeneity between the standards and our explained variable is count, we run fixed 
effect regression with a poisson estimator. 
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1: Panel fixed effect poisson estimation of patent declarations Observations: 6550 
Number of groups: 350 
Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard error   (z statistic) 
Consortium active -0.2637    0.0379  (-6.95) 
Pool active 2.1818   0.1592  (13.71) 
Pool to be launched 1.1556    0.1673  (6.91) 
Release 0.1130 0.0559  (2.02) 
Number of amendments -0.0128 0.0291  (-0.44) 
Periods since last release -0.0454 0.0075  (-6.10) 
Number of pages  0.0013 0.0001 (12.82) 
Age of the standard 3.7723 0.8572  (4.40) 
Age of the standard squared 0.0001 0.0000  (13.12) 
Calendar year -0.1292 0.0281  (-4.59) 
Class control 0.2245 0.0802  (2.80) 
SDO control 7.2679 0.5903  (12.31) 
 
We can infer from the results that consortia and pools have a very significant influence on the 
declaration patterns for formal standards. The activity of an informal consortium significantly 
reduces the number of declarations on the related standard, while pools significantly increase the 
number of declarations. The variables for standardization activity and the life time of the standard 
seem to capture very well the by now established link between standardization and declarations. 
Most coefficients are highly significant and all signs are as expected. The most interesting finding 
for the time span is that while declarations typically take place close to releases, the number of 
declarations increases with the age of the standard. This means that there are more new declarations 
triggered by later than by earlier standard versions.   
Interpretation of these findings is now more straightforward. For a given standard, and controlling 
for the common timing of patent declarations, the time when a patent pool is active is associated 
with a very strong propensity to declare patents as essential. This finding confirms results in the 
literature (Baron & Delcamp, 2010) that patent pools increase incentives to file further patents on 
the technology included into a standard. As patent pools distribute royalty income proportionally to 
the number of patents, companies have obvious incentives to introduce as many patents as possible. 
We furthermore confirm theoretical results in the literature (Versaevel & Dequiedt, 2007) 
predicting a strong increase in patent files and declarations when a patent pool is about to be 
created.  
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The finding of a strong and significant negative effect of a consortium on the number of declared 
patents is new. We believe that this result provides further evidence for the role that informal 
consortia play in regulating firm strategies and in curbing non-cooperative behavior. As we control 
for standardization activity, the negative effect of consortia on patent declarations cannot be 
interpreted as a reduction in related innovation or intensity of innovation. We furthermore verify 
that the decrease in the number of patents declared essential does not go along with a decreasing 
number of firms declaring essential patents (results in Annex 3). It can therefore be ruled out that 
our finding of a negative effect of consortia on the number of patent declarations is an indicator of 
exclusionary effects.  
Rather it seems that consortia reduce the propensity to declare many essential patents at given 
number of firms and given standardization activity. Massive filing and declaration of a high number 
of essential patents can be interpreted as the outcome of a non-cooperative equilibrium. Every firm 
files a high number of essential patents in order to obtain a significant share in the royalty incomes. 
As the competitors do the same, the relative shares remain the same, but the costs for patent 
applications and licensing transactions increase. Coordination mechanisms between standardization 
participants such as informal consortia seem to be at least partially effective in curbing this type of 
inefficient strategic interplay.  
Some caveats are warranted for interpretation of our results. Even though fixed effect panel analysis 
should sufficiently take care of unobserved heterogeneity, potentially severe methodological issues 
may still affect our results. For instance we have to investigate whether our explanatory variables 
are exogenous. It can for instance be argued that pools are launched when a significant number of 
patent declarations is foreseeable. In this case once again uncertainty over the direction of causation 
will make straightforward interpretation of the results difficult. Furthermore, the explanatory 
variables could be influenced by the past outcomes of the explained variable. It is possible that the 
stock of patents already declared essential has an impact on the eventual standardization activity. In 
this case, the explanatory variables would not be independent of the error term. In spite of these 
limitations, we believe that our results are sufficiently robust and significant to support our 
conclusions. 
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RESEARCH OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSION  
With the use of an exhaustive and comprehensive data set of formal standards that include IPR, our 
analysis is the first to evaluate the effects of informal industry consortia and patent pools on the 
interplay between patents and formal standards. The analysis is able to distinguish different factors 
that can trigger or inhibit a patent declaration and discusses the different influences. Our statistical 
results provide evidence that not only the standard size or the standardization process influences a 
patent declaration, but that pools and consortia have a significant impact. 
Our results reveal the close link between standardization and declaration of essential patents, as 
evidences through the timing of patent declarations. Furthermore our calculations revealed a size 
effect, showing that a standard with a higher number of pages is likely to increase a higher number 
of patent declarations. A possible interpretation is that big standards affect a wider field of 
technology and have thus more essential patents included. 
Less obvious seems the influence of patent pools and informal consortia on formal standards that 
include patents. Our findings on patent pools are conform with theoretical predictions and other 
empirical studies supporting the assumption that pools can induce companies to file more standard 
related patents. Yet, our results are even more precise, since our analysis controls for 
standardization activities.. The effect of a patent pool on filing of standard related patents thus also 
accrues when there is no additional activity in the respective standard. These findings indicate an 
opportunistic patent behavior. The increase in the number of patents induced by patent pools is 
unlikely to reflect an increase in innovation. Patents are more likely filed only to receive royalties in 
view of the existence of a patent pool. 
The other external factor that influences a patent declaration is the existence of an informal 
consortium which accompanies formal standardization. In contrast to patent pools, consortia reduce 
the number of patent declarations. In time periods for which we can identify an informal consortium 
relating to a concrete formal standard, patent declarations are less frequent, controlling for the 
standardization activities and the existence of a pool. These findings are in line with the extant 
literature, where the role of informal consortia is mostly described to act as a technological selector. 
The decreased number of patent declarations could thus reflect a lesser degree of wasteful 
duplication of R&D efforts. However, our results could also indicate that informal consortia can 
function as an external forum to manage the questions of IPR and thus reduce non-cooperative 
patent strategies. This interpretation gains further support taking into consideration the positive 
effect of consortia on the likelihood that there will be a patent pool. Besides these relationships, 
consortia are more likely to accompany standards for which a high number of firms have declared 
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essential patents. The latter result indicates a need for an external coordination forum when the 
number of patent holders increases. 
Taking all our results into account, we conclude that patent activity accompanying the 
standardization process is influenced by two factors: Patent pools create incentives for strategic 
patenting and informal consortia reduce such behavior. We conclude that consortia that have a 
connection to a formal standard organization pursue regulatory functions that can reduce costly 
patent inflation around technological standards. A cooperation of informal and formal 
standardization can thus be a solution to solve the problems of essential IPR upfront.  
The effect of patent pools on essential patents can be discussed controversially. On the one hand 
researchers see the objective that a patent pool is usually created to reduce transaction cost and 
solve the licensing problem. Even if the number of essential patents increases, the pool can still 
reduce license fees and make licensees and consumers better off. But on the other hand our results 
confirm previous results that patent pools increase incentives for costly opportunistic patent 
behavior.  
A future research topic is the inverse effects of our variables and especially the effects of patents on 
standardization. Building upon our data panel we are able to test the impacts of essential patents on 
standardization activities such as releases or amendments. In addition we will also investigate the 
direct contribution of informal consortia and patent pools to the standardization process.  
 25 
REFERENCES 
Baron, J., Delcamp, H. (2010): Strategic inputs into patent pools, Cerna working paper. 
Bekkers, R., Duysters G., Verspagen B. (2001): Intellectual property rights, strategic technology 
agreements and market structure The case of GSM, Research Policy 31 (2002) 1141–1161. 
Besen S. M., Levinson R. J. (2009): Standards, Intellectual Property Disclosure, and Patent 
Royalties after Rambus, North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology Volume 10, Issue 2: 
SPRING 2009. 
Blind, K., Thumm, N. (2004): Interrelation between patenting and standardization strategies: 
empirical evidence and policy implications, Research Policy 33 (2004) 1583–1598. 
Blind K., Edler J., Frietsch R., Schmoch U. (2006): Motives to patent: Empirical evidence from 
Germany, Research Policy 35 (2006) 655–672. 
Blind, K., Gauch, S. (2008): Trends in ICT standards: The relationship between European 
standardization bodies and standards consortia, Telecommunications Policy 32 (2008) 503– 
513. 
Cargill, C. (2002). Intellectual Property Rights and Standards Setting Organizations: An Overview 
of failed evolution, A Report Issued By the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission, March 2002. 
Delcamp, H. (2010): Essential patents in pools: Is value intrinsic or induced?, Cerna working 
paper. 
Devlin, A. (2009): Standard-Setting and the Failure of Price Competition, working paper.  
Gilbert, R. (2009): Ties that Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools, working paper. 
Heller M. A., Eisenberg R. S. (1998): Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Reserach, 280, Science, 698-701.  
Hovenkamp, H. J. (2008): Patent Continuations, Patent Deception, and Standard Setting: the 
Rambus and Broadcom decisions, working paper. 
 26 
Iversen, J. E. (2002): Standardization and Intellectual Property Rights: ETSI’s controversial search 
for new IPR-procedures, SIIT proceedings paper.   
ISO, IEC (2009): ISO/IEC directives Part1, Seventh edition, 2009. 
Koehler, F., Blind K., Thumm, N. (2009): Keep ’Em In, Make ’Em Fit - An Analysis of Patent 
Filing Behaviour for Essential Patents in Standards, Working Paper Oct 2009. 
Lamley M. A. (2002): Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations, Public Law 
and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 84. 
Lampe, R., Moser, P. (2009): Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th 
century Sewing Machine Industry, working paper. 
Layne-Farrar A. (2008): Innovative or Indefensible? An Empirical Assessment of Patenting within 
Standard Setting, working paper. 
Layne-Farrar A., Lerner J. (2008): To Join or not to Join: Examining Patent Pool Participation and 
Rent Sharing Rules, working paper. 
Layne-Farrar, A. (2010): Is EX ANTE the Norm? An Empirical Look at IPR Disclosure Timing 
within Standard Setting, working paper. 
Leiponen A. E. (2008): Competing Through Cooperation: The Organization of Standard Setting in 
Wireless Telecommunications, Management Science Vol. 54, No. 11, November 2008, pp. 
1904–1919. 
Lerne, J. and Tirole, J. (2004): Efficient Patent Pools, American Economic Review, vol. 94(3) 
Parchomovsky, G. and Wagner, R. (2005) : Patent Portfolios, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, vol. 154(1) 
Pohlmann, T. (2010): Attributes and Dynamic Development Phases of Informal ICT Standards 
Consortia, working paper. 
Quint, D. (2006): Economics of Patent Pools when Some (but not all) Patents are Essential, SIEPR 
Discussion Paper 
 27 
Rysman M., Simcoe T. (2008), “Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard Setting 
Organizations”, Management Science, Vol. 54, N 11, pp. 1920-1934 
Rysman, M., Simcoe, T. (2007): The Performance of Standard Setting Organizations: Using Patent 
Data for Evaluation, Journal of IT Standards & Standardization Research, 5(1), 25-40, January-
June 2007 25. 
Shurmer M., Lea G. (1995): Telecommunication Standardization and intellectual property rights: A 
fundamental dilemma?, Standard review Vol. 3, No. 2 June/1995. 
Updegrove, A. (2008). The Essential Guide to Standards, Handbook of Consortium Info in: 
[http://www.consortiuminfo.org]. 
























1: Cross section logistic regression of Pool existence  Observations: 505 
Pseudo R2: 0.6202 
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust Standard error   (z statistic) 
Consortium  3.09024*** .7255506 (4.26) 
Disclosure .0838272 .0601906 (1.39) 
Disclosure Square -.0000989 .0000765 (-1.29) 
Releases -.0216049 .2127078 (-0.10) 
Amendments .0408008 .0719585 (0.57) 
Max. Number of pages -.0031472 .0042315 (-0.74) 
Age of the standard -.0088449 .0076133 (-1.16) 
SSO control 3.19976 1.678314 (1.91) 
Class control .8939068 2.156379 (0.41) 
Constant -3.052229 3.049806 (-1.00) 















2: Cross section logistic regression of Consortium existence Observations: 505 
Pseudo R2: 0.4746 
Explanatory variable Coefficient Robust Standard error   (z statistic) 
Disclosing Firms .0830314** .0375539 (2.21) 
Disclosure .0250553 .0230618 (1.09) 
Disclosure Square -.0000364 .0000339 (-1.07) 
Releases .2246963 .1091483 (1.99) 
Amendments .0618078 .1041291 (0.59) 
Max. Number of pages .0014073 .0013853 (1.02) 
Age of the standard .0007059 .0034032 (0.21) 
SSO control 2.945205 .3682875 (8.00) 
Class control -.0216145 .7564973 (-0.03) 
Constant -3.966872 1.881635 (-2.11) 
Regressions with robust standard errors. Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
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Fixed effect Poisson estimation of the number of new declaring firms  
 
        Number of observations: 7296 
        Number of groups:         356 
 
Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard error   (z statistic) 
Consortium active -.0563868 .067236 (0.40) 
Pool active 1.286396*** .2785981 (4.62) 
Pool to be launched -.0159524 .3317361 (-0.05) 
Release .1942518** .0821732 (2.36) 
Number of amendments .0466482 .0630234 (0.74) 
Periods since last release -.0396056*** .0108169 (-3.66) 
Number of pages  -.0003027 .0002831 (-1.07) 
Age of the standard -.1394367*** .0152309 (-9.15) 
Age of the standard squared .0001121 .000131 (8.53) 
 SDO control dummies not reported. 
 Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
 
 
 
